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Title Companies And The





The legal profession has long enjoyed the protection of statutes,
case law and professional standards that tend to insulate the practic-
ing bar from competition. While the maintenance of well-articu-
lated standards of conduct and competence undeniably redounds to
the good of a public that generally has little comprehension of legal
intricacies and that, consequently, reposes its trust in the offices of its
counselors, the effect of this complex of precepts is commonly the
economic aggrandizement of a select interest and the bestowal of an
equivocal benefit upon the diverse interests that are purportedly
served. Furtherance of the public welfare, a concept that necessarily
defies classification, has nevertheless been equated frequently with
the expansion of the role of the legal profession.' This inversion and
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1. Professor Johnstone, quoting numerous examples of what has developed into an un-
authorized practice rhetoric, noted the evolution of a "rather clear-cut bar ideology on unau-
thorized practice .. " Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle Among
Power Groups, 4 KAN. L. REV. 1, 44-46 (1955). The general outlines of this "ideology" are
depicted as follows:
The public utterances of bar leaders on the subject of unauthorized practice con-
tain much that is emotional and unobjective, and customarily associate the good of
the public with the good of the bar. Part of this can be attributed to exuberant advo-
cacy, part of it to a deepseated human desire to be on the side of the good and the
confusion of interests2 is evidenced most clearly by the efforts of
the organized bar to implement the mandate of Canon 3 of the
American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility that
"[a] lawyer should assist in preventing the unauthorized practice of
law." 3
The crux of the unauthorized practice controversy is not
whether lay persons should be permitted to engage in the practice of
law, since few would venture such a radical proposition, but the ap-
propriate scope of the formula "practice of law." Two questions in-
evitably arise from this definitional problem: what acts comprise the
practice of law and who decides what constitutes the practice of law?
Traditionally, it has been stated that "those acts, whether performed
in court or in the law office, which lawyers customarily have carried
on from day to day through the centuries must constitute 'the prac-
tice of law.' "I In effect, the practice of law is what lawyers do. The
resolution to the second query logically follows from the answer to
the first: lawyers have defined the bounds of their own monopoly.
Opposition of potential competitors to this self-definition of exclu-
sive roles has struck some responsive chords with the judiciary5 and
may result in a definition of "practice of law" that more perfectly
accommodates the diversity of interests represented by the public.
The restrictive pattern of self-regulation and exclusion of al-
ternative services from the performance of selected tasks has encoun-
tered increasingly staunch opposition, particularly in the subject
righteous no matter what the facts. The same kind of self-serving emotionalism char-
acterizes public comments of businessmen on unauthorized practice.
Id at 6 (footnotes omitted).
2. See Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L REV.
702, 704 (1977). Professor Morgan considers the prohibition of the unauthorized practice of
law "[plerhaps the clearest example of a Code standard which operates primarily for the bene-
fit of lawyers. . . ." Id at 707.
3. The Ethical Considerations clarifying and further defining the principles expressed in
the corresponding canon justify the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law as a
regulatory mechanism. IEC 3-3 articulates this rationale most clearly as follows:
A non-lawyer who undertakes to handle legal matters is not governed as to integrity
or legal competence by the same rules that govern the conduct of a lawyer. A lawyer
is not only subject to that regulation but also is committed to high standards of ethi-
cal conduct. The public interest is best served in legal matters by a regulated profes-
sion committed to such standards.
Notwithstanding this perceived public need, the Ethical Considerations concede that the
proper function of the legal profession is to educate the public about the need for legal assist-
ance and to make legal representation available. See EC 3-7. For an excellent explication of
Canon 3, see Note, A Lawyer's Duty Not to Aidthe Unauthorized Practice ofLaw-Canon 3 and
the Code of Professional Responsibility, 79 DICK. L. REV. 701 (1975).
4. State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz 76, 37, 366 P.2d 1, 9 (1961),
supplemented, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962); accord, Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128
Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623 (1941).
5. See, e.g., Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.
Va. 1977), order vacated pending resolution of state law question, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 941 (1978); State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 91 N.M. 434, 575 P.2d
943 (1978).
areas of tax counseling,6 conveyancing,7 debt collection,' and the
preparation and sale of legal forms.' Of this host of potential com-
petitors, the commercial title insurance companies have excited per-
haps the most commentary. The reaction of the organized bar to the
activities of title insurers has assumed several common forms; it has
fostered court actions for injunctive relief' ° and contempt proceed-
ings for the alleged unauthorized practice of law," the promulgation
of unauthorized practice of law opinions' 2 and the establishment of
bar-related or lawyer-controlled title insurance companies' 3 that
6. See, e.g., Creekmore v. zard, 236 Ark. 558, 367 S.W.2d 419 (1963) (court in declara-
tory judgment action concluded that a notary public does not engage in practice of law by
preparing income tax returns); Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App.2d 807, 273 P.2d 619 (1954)
(although preparation of return by C.P.A. did not constitute practice of law, accountant, by
preparing application for carry-back adjustment of loss suffered by taxpayer and resisting ad-
ditional assessments, engaged in unauthorized practice); In re New York Co. Lawyers Ass'n
(In re Bercu), 273 App. Div. 524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1948), aft'd, 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451
(1949) (C P.A. found in contempt for furnishing legal advice unconnected with accounting
work); Anot., 9 A.L.R.2d 797 (1950) (cataloging cases dealing with unauthorized practice of
law in matters of taxation).
7. See, e.g., Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.
Va. 1977), order vacated pending resolution of state law question, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 941 (1978); State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d
1 (1961), supplemented, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962); Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v.
Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957); State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title
Co., 91 N.M. 434, 575 P.2d 943 (1978); Bar Ass'n of Tennessee, Inc. v. Union Planters Title
Guar. Co., 326 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959); Hamner, Title Insurance Companies and the
Practice of Law, 14 BAYLOR L. REV. 384 (1962); Hill, Real Estate Brokers and the Courts, 5
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 72 (1938); Houck, Drafting ofReal Estate Instruments.- The Problem
from the Standpoint ofthe Bar, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 66 (1938); Marks, The Lawyers and
the Realtors: Arizona's Experience, 49 A.B.A.J. 139 (1963); Nelson, Drafting of Real Estate
Instruments: The Problem from the Standpoint ofthe Realtors, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB 57
(1938); Editorial, Lay Assaults on the Practice of Law, 49 A B.A.J. 162 (1963); Annot., 85
A.L.R.2d 184 (1962) (collecting cases questioning activities of lending institutions, insurance
companies and title and abstract companies incident to the examination and perfection of title
to realty); Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 788 (1957) (analyzing cases litigating conduct of real estate
agents, brokers or managers in completing instruments relating to conveyance of real estate).
8. See, e.g., State exrel Porter v. Dun & Bradstreet, 352 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Ala. 1972),
aft'd, 472 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir 1973) (sending of collection notices that threatened enforcement,
but did not mention suit or legal proceedings, did not constitute unlawful practice); State ex
rel Norvell v. Credit Bureau of Albuquerque, 85 N.M. 521, 514 P.2d 40 (1973) (although
issuance of collection letters did not constitute unauthorized practice, collection agency could
not take assignments of creditors' claims and prosecute them in its own name); Annot., 27
A.L.R.3d 1152 (1969) (collecting cases that consider whether collection agency has engaged in
unauthorized practice of law).
9. See, e.g., New York Co. Lawyers Ass'n v. Dacey, 21 N.Y.2d 694,234 N.E.2d 459, 287
N.Y.S.2d 422 (1967) (providing legal forms does not, in itself, constitute unauthorized prac-
tice); Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913 (Ore. 1975) (defendants could not be en-
joined from merely publishing or selling divorce kits so long as they had no personal contact
with customers), noted in 1976 DET. C. L. REv. 293. See generaly Buesser, The "Kit"Age and
Unauthorized Practice, 39 UNAUTH. PRAc. NEWS 12 (1974).
10. See, e.g., Land Title Co. v. State ex rel. Porter, 292 Ala 691, 299 So.2d 289 (1974);
The Florida Bar v. McPhee, 195 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1967); State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title
Co., 91 N.M. 434, 575 P.2d 943 (1978).
11. See, e.g., Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 397
(Ky. 1961).
12. See, e.g., Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.
Va. 1977), order vacated pending resolution ofstate law question, 571 F 2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 941 (1978).
13. Reacting to what they perceived as the diminishing role of the lawyer in the real
raise a panoply of antitrust' 4 and ethical' 5 questions.
estate settlement, attorneys in a number of states sought to improve their competitive positions
by forming title companies of their own. The first, the Florida Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund,
was created in 1947 as a Massachusetts business trust. See, Carter, A New Rolefor Lawyers-
The Florida Lawyers Title Guaranty Fund, 45 A.B.A.J. 803 (1959); Carter, Lawyers' Title Guar-
anty Fund, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 480 (1955). Its operation is illustrative of the fund concept.
Membership in the fund is limited to lawyers. On becoming a member each lawyer makes an
initial contribution of a prescribed amount, which is credited to his account. Thereafter, each
time he issues a fund guarantee he makes an additional contribution that constitutes, in effect,
a premium, which is similarly credited to his account. At the conclusion of each year the
attorney is credited with his share of the fund's income on investments and charged with his
share of its expenses, which share is proportioned to the amount of additional annual contribu-
tions. Credit balances are distributed periodically. The organizational features of various bar-
related funds are diagrammed in a pamphlet recently published by the American Bar Associa-
tion Standing Committee on Lawyers' Title Guaranty Funds to promote the cause of bar-
related title assurance. How-To-Do-Ift MISSING BAR-RELATED TITLE ASSURING ORGANI-
ZATIONS 6-7 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as How-To-Do-IT].
The purpose of the bar-related assuring organizations is readily discernable: to enhance
the competitive position of the attorney in real property transactions. The economic basis for
these funds is emphasized in a further brochure distributed by the Standing Committee to
explain the principles of the bar-related movement. This brochure opens with the following
set of queries entitled "A Test for Every Lawyer Regarding the Extent of His Real Property
Practice":
Survey your practice for a few weeks, tabulating daily your answers to these ques-
tions:
1. What is your gross revenue from real property work? Has it diminished
because your former clients are patronizing lay agencies?
2. What percentage of your closings produce a fully adequate fee?
3. What percentage of your clients do you confidently expect to represent in
future real property transactions?
Now, based on the survey data, make up your own mind as to how important the
bar-related title movement is---or can be-to you.
MISSING BAR-RELATED TITLE ASSURING ORGANIZATIONS 2 (1976).
Although several reasons have been propounded for the existence of the bar-related or-
ganization, most authorities concur that the purpose is to affirm the role of the attorney in the
real estate transaction. See Kellogg, Bar-Related Title Insurance, 14 PRAc. LAWYER 13, 16
(1968); Lancaster, Title Insurance-A Survey Inquiry, I GLENDALE L. REV. 28, 42-44 (1976);
Payne, The Restoration of Conveyancing, 15 ALA. L. REV. 371, 385 (1963). Professor Payne,
however, has noted a further purpose for the fund concept; he would promote its implementa-
tion as a means to streamline and reform substantially the traditional conveyancing process.
Payne, Title Guaranty Funds.- Symptom, Cure or Nostrum? 46 IND. L.J. 208 (1971). The need
for such reform was discussed in Payne's earlier essay entitled In Search of Title, 14 ALA. L.
REV. 11, 278 (1961). One of the most fervent proponents of the bar-related movement has
characterized the concept as "a milestone in the fight against unauthorized law practice," Bal-
bach, Title Assurance: A New Approach to Unauthorized Practice, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 192,
198 (1965), although a commentator has noted more correctly that the movement is an alterna-
tive method and not a weapon in the unauthorized practice arsenal. Comment, Title Insur-
ance, 13 ALA. L. REV. 381, 405 (1961) ("the activities of the title companies which are most
economically damaging to the attorneys are not unlawful. For these reasons, a second method
of attack is being used, viz., competition").
14. The goal of bar-related and lawyer-controlled companies is ultimately to restore to
the legal profession a monopoly in real estate conveyancing and to exclude commercial title
companies, realtors and lawyers not engaged in the private practice of law from most aspects
of the process. A forceful argument can be advanced that the organization of the bar-related
companies to effect this purpose results in combinations that violate sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, a tying arrangement in violation of section I of the Sherman Act and illegal
rebates that result in reverse competition. This latter concept is addressed in passing in a
recent study of the title insurance industry. Quiner, Title Insurance and the Title Insurance
Industry, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 711, 723 (1973). The tying aspect is quite apparent from the
following description by a leading advocate of the bar-related movement of the availability of
title assurance:
Title assurance should be available only from lawyers. To allow members of the
public to purchase insurance without the representation by counsel is in violation of
II. The Title Insurance Industry
A. The Concept Defined
Numerous attempts have been made to reduce the concept of
"title insurance" to a workable definition. The importance of such a
formulation should be readily apparent if one considers that the ele-
mental functions of a commercial title insurer cannot constitute the
the principle of providing a complete professional service-a lawyer's advice plus
title insurance.
Balbach, supra note 13, at 202. See generally BAR-RELATED TITLE ASSURING ORGANIZA-
TIONS 8 (1976) ("the fund member who today permits his client to leave his office after a real
estate closing without a fund guarantee is in effect inviting his client to take his next closing to
a lay agency).
That the practices of the legal profession in general, and bar associations in particular, are
amenable to antitrust scrutiny was established in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975), in which case the United States Supreme Court found that the promulgation of a mini-
mum fee schedule by a state bar association constituted price-fixing in violation of the Sher-
man Act. The nature of the "learned profession" alone does not insulate from the federal
antitrust laws. Nor did the Court deem the state action immunity doctrine articulated in
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), applicable, since the price-fixing activity had not been
compelled by the state acting as sovereign. While Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977), acknowledged, in principal, the amenability of the legal profession to the antitrust laws,
the Bates court discerned the requisite compulsion in pervasive state supreme court supervi-
sion of the advertising ban. For a discussion of the antitrust standards applicable to the orga-
nized bar, see 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1061 (1978) (noting Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia
State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977)).
15. A lawyer who is affiliated with a bar-related company receives from the company
what constitutes, in effect, rebates, commissions or dividends depending on the nature of the
fund organization. Since the amount of return is proportionate to the amount of business
referred to the company, the lawyer will gain financially through the company only to the
extent that he refers business to it. This direct monetary interest of the attorney who would
represent a party to the real estate transaction and also be an owner of or investor in the title
company provides an added incentive to consummate the transaction notwithstanding remote
defects in title. The lawyer also has an interest in limiting the company's loss by securing
various exceptions to coverage not only as a principal of the company, but because, under
some plans, his account will be charged for the loss attributable to the claim and will offset his
share of earnings and profits while, under another system, the value of his ownership interest is
reduced to the extent of successful claims. In states in which title policies vary in coverage the
attorney who is personally interested in a title company will be motivated to restrict the
sources of insurance available to his client
Few attempts have been made to come to terms with the conflicts inherent in the opera-
tion of bar-related or lawyer-controlled title companies, and most commentators seem to be
content with the rationale that all attorneys inevitably will place their clients' interests ahead of
their own. See, e.g., Balbach, supra note 13, at 202-03; Kellogg, supra note 13, at 16-17. This
same sentiment is echoed in the two recent ABA publications advertising the bar-related title
movement, How-To-Do-IT, supra note 13, and BAR-RELATED TITLE ASSURING ORGANIZA-
TIONS, supra note 13. The former publication notes the circumstance that "[a] favorite attack
upon the concept of bar-related title assurance is to charge the lawyer who provides title insur-
ance, along with his legal opinion, with a conflict of interest." How-To-Do-IT, supra at 2.
The response to this challenge is the assurance that "[l]awyers are professionals who are re-
quired to place their clients' interests before their own. Commercial title insurance companies
often find this proposition difficult to comprehend." Id Similarly, the latter publication also
offers the palliative that "[the position of trust occupied by lawyers is not based upon the
absence of a conflict of interest but rather upon the ability of lawyers to resolve such conflicts
by invariably placing the clients' interests ahead of their own." BAR-RELATED TITLE AsSUR-
ING ORGANIZATIONS, supra at 13. The numerous conflict of interest prosecutions and clarify-
ing legal ethics opinions issued by various bar associations suggests that this structuring of
interests often remains an aspiration, not an invariable practice. The suggestion has also been
ventured that the Code of Professional Responsibility effects an inversion of the interests of the
client and the practitioner. Morgan, supra note 2.
practice of law, however broadly construed, unless the issuance of
either a title insurance commitment or a policy of insurance is
deemed to be an opinion of title that represents the application of
legal judgment to a complex of facts. Even the staunchest opponents
of commercial title insurance find this conclusion difficult to ac-
cept. 6 Professor Payne, for example, who has long championed the
cause of thoroughly revamping the conveyancing process and who
regards title insurance as an inevitable barrier to reform' 7 offers the
following synopsis of the lawyer-insurer debate:
A consideration of what is required must have as its starting
point the clear recognition that we are not dealing with an unau-
thorized practice controversy. Title insurance companies, in car-
rying out title search and examination, are not practicing law, and
it would seem unlikely that the bar could induce state legislatures
or the courts to hold otherwise. Where an unauthorized practice
charge has been leveled against the companies it has generally
been directed to their peripheral activities. . . .[S] o long as title
companies are permitted to do business at all they can issue poli-
cies of insurance, and, as a prerequisite thereto, may determine
from the contents of their title plants the nature of the risk as-
sumed. '
8
Thus, unlike the title examination conducted by the attorney or at
his request on the client's behalf for the purpose of preparing a cer-
tificate or opinion of the state of title, the search undertaken by the
insurer is intended to define the risks that the latter is willing to as-
sume and serves a self-protective purpose. The insurance policy is
not an assurance to the homebuyer of peaceful enjoyment of the
property acquired, but merely creates a contractual obligation for a
sum equal to the face amount of the policy in the event that enjoy-
ment of the premises is disturbed.' 9 In practical effect, however, the
16. The contention that issuing title insurance constitutes the rendering of a title opinion
and, therefore, the practice of law was, however, the apparent basis for the unauthorizedprac-
tice opinions challenged in Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp.
298 (E.D. Va. 1977).
17. Payne, supra note 13, notes that
Title insurance was conceived of in an effort to meliorate some of the worst of [the
inefficiency of the conveyancing process). But it is designed to keep the patient alive,
not to cure him, and has the inherent vice that it institutionalizes existing ills. It
should not be treated as creating a vested interest in the inefficiencies of the land
records. The public requires, to the contrary, that means be devised to make convey-
ancing more efficient and more certain. The very existence of title insurance stands
in the way of such an objective.
Id at 387.
18. Id at 374-75.
19. See, e.g., McKillop, Title Insurance, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 447 (1955):
Although a contract of title insurance partakes of the nature of a covenant of war-
ranty or a covenant against encumbrances, it is in fact essentially and solely a con-
tract of indemnity an not a wagering policy or an expression of opinion backed by a
forfeiture. Companies issuing contracts guaranteeing titles are in the insurance busi-
ness. ...
Id at 457-58.
This point has been the subject of considerable controversy, although most commentators
would concur that a commitment or binder for title insurance is a statement of insurability and
title company is not only an insurance issuer, but fulfills a further
social need by clearing certain defects to title, which enhances the
marketability of real estate.20
The principal function of the commercial title insurer is two-
fold: to delineate the apparent defects in title to determine the extent
of insurability by the performance of a title examination and, based
upon the results of this examination, to issue a policy insuring the
applicant against losses caused by a variety of risks that are hidden,
voluntarily assumed or negligently overlooked by the insurer. De-
pending on the character 2' and rate structure22 of the insurer, the
search might also be conducted by the insured's privately retained
attorney who forwards to the title company a certificate of title upon
which insurance will issue.
In contrast to other, more conventional forms of insurance, title
insurance protects against a future loss that has been caused by pre-
existing conditions. The title insurer is not a casualty insurer,23 and
his potential liability is not actuarily predictable. The premium is
not an opinion of title that is intended to counsel the prospective insured about the state of
title. See notes 76-104 and accompanying text infra. See also Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 232, 214 P. 667 (1923), holding that a title company's certificate
constitutes a contract of insurance.
20. Haley, An Explanation of Title Insurance, 40 NEB. L. REV. 342 (1960); Johnstone,
Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492, 494, 513 (1957); Note, (The Title Insurance Industry and
Governmental Regulation, 53 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1543 (1967).
21. It is commonly noted in discussions of the structure of the commercial title insurance
industry that two common forms predominate: the national or lawyer-title company and the
local or title plant company. See, e.g., New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey
Mtg. Assocs., 34 N.J. 301, 169 A.2d 150 (1961); Payne, Title Insurance and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law Controversy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 423, 430, 477-80 (1969). Payne, In Search of
Title (pt. 1), 14 ALA L. REV 11, 37 (1961); Comment, Title Insurance, 13 ALA. L. REV. 381, 393
(1961). Neither of these latter two sources perceives the national company as a threat to the
role of the attorney in the real estate transaction, since this type of insurer issues its policies
predicated upon a certificate issued by an independent attorney. The local company, however,
issues its policies after having the abstracts prepared in its own title plant.
22. Commercial title insurance companies generally adhere to a bifurcated rate structure:
all-inclusive rates encompass title examination, ancillary closing services and the insurance
policy while policy-only or approved-attorney rates exclude examination closing and ancillary
services. Under the latter system the attorney's certification of title is relied upon by the under-
writer to issue a policy and the attorney remits a fee that represents only a sum for the assump-
tion of the insurance risk. B.A. MONYER & J.J.D. LYNCH, PENNSYLVANIA TITLE INSURANCE
THEORY AND PRACTICE 92 (1976).
23. If broadly applied, the typical casualty insurance approach to risk assumption
could have a disastrous effect on titles. If title insurance generally were written on a
risk basis only, without search or examination, there would be a gradual deteriora-
tion in the certainty of titles. It is the curative action taken by owners upon receiving
examination reports from insurers that maintains the high degree of record title cer-
tainty of insured titles. Elimination of the search and examination would remove the
basis for curative action, and as titles become more uncertain, losses would increase
and insurance rates would go up.
Johnstone, supra note 20, at 516; cf Quiner, supra note 14, at 714-15 ("Although an argument
could possibly be made for writing title insurance on a casualty basis, this would tend to un-
dermine the risk elimination facet"). See also Haley, supra note 20, at 343. Several states
specifically require that title insurance policies issue only after title examination, and thereby
statutorily eliminate the casualty aspect. (See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 910.7 (Purdon
1963). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627 784 (West 1972) (prohibiting writing of title insurance
on casualty basis).
paid but once-when the policy becomes effective-although the
policy remains in effect until the insured can no longer incur loss
from the risks that have not been excepted.24 Title insurance can, on
the basis of these characteristics, be defined as a contract of indem-
nity relating to a specific parcel of realty described in the policy is-
sued for a valuable consideration, which contract evidences an
undertaking to indemnify the insured against loss in a specified
amount by reason of defects of title, liens or encumbrances upon the
realty existing at the date of the policy and not expressly excepted by
the language of the policy.25
B. The Evolution of the Commercial Title Industry
Although it long has been evident that purchasers cannot re-
ceive adequate protection of their interests in the premises they seek
to acquire without some guaranty that title is good and marketable,
the title insurance industry did not develop until late in the history of
conveyancing and grew only slowly at first. The traditional means of
securing title to realty had been the laborious examination of docu-
ments relating to title by attorneys and the issuance by them of opin-
ions or certificates based on this examination.26 The lawyer's
24. These distinctions between the risks of title insurers and those of carriers in other
conventional insurance fields have been noted in numerous commentaries. See, eg., E. ROB-
ERTS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF TITLE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND ABSTRACTERS 4-5 (1961);
McKillop, supra note 19, at 458 (citing Trenton Potteries Co. v Title Guar. &. Trust Co., 176
N.Y. 65, 68 N.E. 132 (1903)). Payne, in his article entitled Title Insurance andthe Unauthorized
Practice of Law Controyersy, 53 MINN. L. REV. 423 (1969), doubts that the term "insurance"
can be invoked to legitimize the conduct of commercial title companies and urges the rejection
of "the verbal trap created by the word 'insurance.'" Id at 441. But see Title Ins. & Trust Co.
v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 232, 214 P 667 (1923).
25. See Foehrenbach v. German-American Title & Trust Co., 217 Pa. 331, 333-34, 66 A.
561 -, 562 (1907); Craig, What is Title Insurance?, 25 LAWY. & BANK. & CENT. L J. 134
(1932); Pelkey, The Law of Title Insurance, 12 MARQ. L REV. 38, 42-43 (1927); Quiner, supra
note 14, at 714; Comment, Title Insurance, 13 ALA. L. REV. 381, 385, 384-85 n. 28 (1961).
26. In a study of title insurance and the adequacy of the then current insurance coverage,
a Minnesota county bar association offered the following introductory statement:
Title insurance is a natural result of the defects inherent in our recording acts,
and of the economic waste perpetuated by a system which requires the laborious
examination of a whole chain of title by a lawyer each time title is transferred. In
addition, there is some truth, at least, in the claim that the services of some title
attorneys are unsatisfactory and redress against them difficult to obtain.
These fundamentals must be faced. It is useless to 'howl down' the truth. One of
the duties of the legal profession is to consider what is best for the public in a given
situation; and it cannot take a wholly selfish view bottomed on the idea that lawyers
are traditionally entitled to prevail in certain fields of endeavor to the exclusion of all
other persons. The legal profession must be prepared to demonstrate that its services
really are superior, and that it gives to the public as much, or more, than some other
competing service can. In the end, the public will get what it wants and deserves, and
competition cannot be eliminated by a combination of noise, vituperation, anger and
bad judgment.
It can be demonstrated that we lawyers can compete legitimately in the title
field, although we may not be its only occupants, and this is the course which should
be followed.
Young, MacGregor & Solether, Report of the Special Committee of the Hennepin County Bar
Association Appointed to Study Title Insurance, 19 MINN. L. REV. 354, 355 (1935). The report
then continues with the following summation:
opinion, however, offered protection only against patent defects of
title27 that could have been ascertained by a careful search of the
public registries. The purchaser's protection was, therefore, quite
limited since the examining attorney was not a guarantor of title and
the injured party's only recourse was an action for a negligent or
otherwise defective search of title. Hidden or latent defects, thus,
would escape detection and leave the purchaser or mortgagee reme-
diless. A contract of insurance, in contrast, would assure indemnifi-
cation for all losses from defects in or clouds on title predating the
time of issuance, unless the cause of injury had been specifically ex-
cepted, notwithstanding that the claimant might be unable to prove a
negligent act or omission.28
Title insurance is believed to have its origins in the creation in
1853 of the Law Property Assurance and Trust Society of Philadel-
phia for the purpose of insuring defective titles and guaranteeing re-
payments on loans and mortgages.29 Commonly acknowledged as
the motivating force inspiring the further development of the idea of
In short, it is the inherent defects of the recording acts, both legal and economic,
plus the poor service given by some attorneys, plus the desire to have the correctness
of an opinion on title backed by a corporation of sound financial strength, that gives
rise to the demand for 'something better.'
Id at 356. In addressing the circumstances permitting the rapid expansion of the commercial
title industry and the concomitant displacement of the attorney from the function of searching
and certifying title, Professor Karl Llewellyn offered the following observation:
[S]ome of these encroachments on the practitioner's ancient fields are like the en-
croachments of the white man on the Indian: neither right nor law, nor tradition nor
stubborn fighting by the gathered tribe, will over long hold up the dispossession. A
title company simply can more effectively gather records than the ordinary lawyer
can; and over the years it can therefore organize to do a job both more quickly, more
effectively and more cheaply ...
Llewellyn, The Bars Troubles andPoultices--and Cures?, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 104, 112
(1938); cf. Payne, Title Insurance and the Unauthorized Practice of Law Controversy, 53 MINN.
L. REV. 423, 468 (1969) ("Corporate conveyancing came into existence largely because of legit-
imate dissatisfaction with the inefficiency of traditional land transfers").
27. In noting the deficiencies of the title opinion method of title assurance, McKillop lists
the following considerations:
(2) The title opinion covers only that segment of title rights reflected by the public
records.
(3) Title examiners make mistakes. Liability under a title opinion is limited to
losses arising from failure to exercise a reasonable degree of care and professional
skill.
McKillop, supra note 19, at 455; accord, Kellogg, supra note 13, at 14; Lancaster, supra note
13, at 30. Compilations of latent defects that could not be detected from an examination of
public records can be found in the following sources: Johnstone, supra note 20, at 494-97;
Lancaster, supra note 13, at 29; McKillop, supra note 19, at 452.
28. The liability of the title insurer is predicated on the contract of indemnity, for the
breach of which the law provides a remedy without regard to the insurer's observance of due
care. Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 232, 214 P. 667 (1923). Thus,
althouqh it is frequently noted that a lawyer's certificate protects the assured against patent
title defects and that the title insurer insures only against the lesser risk of latent defects, see,
e.g., Lancaster, supra note 13, at 30, the practical effect of the title policy is also to guarantee
the accuracy of the examination of title, which will reduce the claimant's burden of proof in
the event of a covered loss. See Roberts. Title Insurance- State Regulation and the Public Per-
spective, 39 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (1963); Note, The Tide Insurance Industry and Governmental Regula-
tion, 53 VA. L. REv. 1523, 1525 (1967).
29. Lancaster, supra note 13, at 31; Young, MacGregor & Solether, supra note 26, at 357.
title insurance3" was the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion in
Watson v. Muirhead,3  in which the court reached the unassuming
conclusion that a conveyancer does not guarantee the titles he re-
views.32 Subsequently a plan for the insurance of titles and mort-
gages by the Title Warranty Company was published.33 Pursuant to
the first enabling legislation providing for the formation of corpora-
tions for the specific purpose of insuring titles to realty,34 several pro-
gressive conveyancers in 1876 obtained a franchise from the
governor of Pennsylvania authorizing the conduct of business by the
Real Estate Title Insurance Company whose contracts guaranteed
the accuracy of title examinations and indemnified against loss. 35
From Pennsylvania the concept of title insurance as a commercial
venture was transplanted into New York and Washington, D.C., and
ultimately throughout the major metropolitan centers of the nation.
Apparently, real estate attorneys initially offered little resistance
to the intrusion of the commercial title insurers into their practice
and were quite willing to surrender the less remunerative aspects of
conveyancing.36 With the passage of time institutional lenders and
30. Professor Gage characterized the effect of Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161 (1868), see
notes 30 and 31 infra, as bringing "forcibly to the attention of the public the inherent weakness
of the then existing methods of assuring title." D.D. GAGE, LAND TITLE ASSURING AGENCIES
80-81 (1937)."
31. 57 Pa. 161 (1868). The defendant in the Watson case was a lay conveyancer em-
ployed by the purchaser to ascertain whether the property he sought to acquire was free of
encumbrances. Relying on the opinion of counsel to whom he had submitted an abstract of
title, the defendant represented to the purchaser that the subject tract was free of encum-
brances and that a certain outstanding judgment did not constitute a lien. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court rendered the following opinion concerning the scope of the title examiner's
liability:
If the defendant had undertaken to act upon his own opinion that the judgment,
which appeared in the searches, was not a final one, and therefore not a lien upon the
ground-rent, the title of which it was his duty to examine, could we say that. . . the
mistake was one which could only result from the want of ordinary knowledge and
skill or the failure to exercise due caution?. . . We think the court below was right
in refusing to charge as requested in the plaintiffs points; all of which assume as a
matter of law that to pass the title with such an encumbrance upon it was evidence of
want of ordinary knowledge and skill and of due caution.
Id at 168.
32. Id The effect of the Pennsylvania court's opinion was to subject the lay conveyancer
to a standard of care corresponding to the standard applicable to attorneys. Id at 167. While
this conclusion might have been anticipated and should not have come as a shock to anyone,
the court's opinion had a decided effect on the movement for more adequate title assurance
because of the contemporary boom in land development, which necessitated greater certainty
in the marketability of title. GAGE, supra, note 30, at 81.
33. GAGE, supra note 29, at 81 n.Il (citing J. JoYCE, LAWS OF INSURANCE 59 (2d ed.
1917)).
34. Pa. P.L. Act No. 32, § 29 (1874) provided, in pertinent part, for the formation of
corporations for the specific purpose of "insuring owners of real estate, mortgages and others
interested in real estate against loss by reason of defective titles, liens and encumbrances."
35. Craig, supra note 25, at 134.
36. Roberts, supra note 28, offers the following commentary on the evolution of the mar-
ket for commercial title insurance:
In the urban centers, given the time needed to search titles, conveyancing was ceasing
to pay its way in large law firms. Concomitantly, given the fact that conveyancing
had become a profitless chore, the industrial development was creating new types of
real estate investors who engaged in the exchange of real estate se-
curities on a national scale found the services offered by title insur-
ance companies particularly appealing because of their uniformity of
practice and since investing institutions lacked both the time and the
personnel to ascertain reliable and financially responsible abstractors
and attorneys wherever they sought to invest.3 7 These investors have
since come to play a pivotal role in the growth of the commercial
title insurance industry.38 Local lending institutions have also come
to require title insurance if they contemplate reselling in the secon-
dary market or if the mortgaged premises secure a loan of substan-
tial proportion.39 Precisely at what point during the evolution of
their industry title insurers began to prepare abstracts of title, draft
documents of conveyance and hold closings in transactions in which
they would issue insurance and sought to enter the small town and
rural markets has not been documented, but presumably that is
when attorneys began to perceive title insurers as a competitive
force.4°
III. The Unauthorized Practice of Law Controversy
A. The Scope of the Concept 'Practice of Law"
Ever since they began to consider the expanding role of the title
insurance industry a threat to their own real estate practices, attor-
neys have in many states sought to enjoin the performance of activi-
ties by commercial companies incident to the issuance of insurance.
Their success has depended primarily on the expansiveness of the
locally accepted definition of unauthorized practice, which has va-
ried greatly from one jurisdiction to another. At one end of the spec-
trum is Pennsylvania, where the unauthorized practice of law is a
misdemeanor entailing the pretense of possessing legal credentials
4'
business for lawyers. As a result conveyancing simply atrophied in the urban firms.
Title insurance companies. . . were more than willing to take over conveyancing
and create their own efficient record systems ....
Id at 7. Roberts adds, "Given the other avenues of business opened by the boom period the
lawyers hardly noticed the loss of the conveyancing trade." Id at 9. See generally Payne, In
Search of Title (pt. 1), 14 ALA. L. REv. 11, 58 (1961). But cf. Oshe, Title Insurance as Protec-
tion to Investors in Real Estate and Real Estate Securities, 5 NOTRE DAME LAw. 237, 238 (1930)
("The commencement of this business everywhere met with very strenuous opposition from
the lawyers").
37. See Johnstone, supra note 20, at 502-05; Payne, The Restoration of Conveyancing, 15
ALA. L. REv. 371, 383 (1962).
38. Johnstone, supra note 20, at 518.
39. Id at 503.
40. See generally id at 518; Lancaster, supra note 13, at 40; Payne, The Restoration of
Conveyancing, 15 ALA. L. REV. 371, 372-73 (1963); Comment, Title Insurance 13 ALA. L. REV.
381, 404-05 (1961).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1608 (Purdon 1962), provides, in pertinent part, that it is
"unlawful for any person ... to practice law [or] to hold himself. . . out to the public as
being entitled to practice law. . . without having first been duly and regularly admitted to
practice law in a court of record of any county in this Commonwealth."
or practicing law without having been admitted to the bar.42 To es-
tablish a violation of the unauthorized practice statutes, the prose-
cuting party must establish that the lay practitioner engaged in a
course of conduct requiring the abstract understanding and concrete
application of complex legal principles4 3 that is not ancillary to a
recognizable business venture" or purported to be a duly admitted
member of the legal profession.45 Accordingly, Pennsylvania courts
have defined the pivotal question in terms of whether the accused
has engaged in the legitimate pursuit of its business or proposes to
function as a lawyer representing and advising his client.46
Invoking this standard, the state supreme court in LaBrum v.
Commonwealth Title Company of Philadelphia47 clearly distinguished
between drawing documents of conveyance48 and holding oneself
out as a lawyer practicing law. Noting that the conduct that gave
rise to the suit was merely incidental to the defendant's business
transactions,49 the court cited the following passage from the earlier
decision in Childs v. Smelzer ° as controlling authority:
42. "Any person who shall practice law, within this Commonwealth, without being a
member of the Bar of a Court of Record, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. ... PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 1610 (Purdon 1962).
43. Dauphin Co. Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 465 Pa. 545, 351 A.2d 229 (1976). The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court posited the caveat, however, in the Mazzacaro case that
The threads of legal consequences often weave their way through even casual con-
temporary interactions. There are times, of course, when it is clearly within the ken
of lay persons to appreciate the legal problems and consequences involved in a given
situation and the factors which should influence necessary decisions. No public inter-
est would be advanced by requiring these lay judgments to be made exclusively by
lawyers.
Id at 553, 351 A.2d at 233. See generally Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 85, 193 A. 20, 21 (1937).
44. Childs v. Smelzer, 315 Pa. 9, 14, 171 A. 883, 885-86 (1934) (dictum).
45. LaBrum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948); Childs v.
Smelzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934).
46. The state supreme court in LaBrum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56
A.2d 246 (1948), exonerated the defendant title insurance company of the unauthorized prac-
tice charges and concluded that all of the company's activities were performed in pursuit of its
conveyancing business. In its answer to plaintiff's bill in equity, the title company had admit-
ted to preparing
for a compensation deeds, mortgages, assignments of mortgages, agreements (but re-
lating solely to real estate matters), releases of real estate and declarations of no set-
off, and no other legal instruments, but we have prepared the foregoing instruments
only for persons to or for whom applications for title insurance had been issued or
were contemplated to be issued by us, and then only in situations, instances, and
circumstances in which such instruments were incidental to the insuring by us of
titles to real estate.
Id at 241, 56 A.2d at 247. Defendant further disclaimed having advised or consulted any
applicant for insurance concerning the applicability of statutes or case law and stated, in con-
clusion, that any services proferred were performed "solely as an incident of and concomitant
with our title insurance business and in connection with our title insurance transactions. We
do not hold ourselves out to the public as willing, able or authorized to do any business except
title insurance business." Id. at 242, 56 A.2d at 247. Because of the procedural posture ofthe
suit, all relevant averments in defendant's answer were accepted by the court as true.
47. 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948).
48. See note 46, supra for an enumeration of the classes of documents in controversy in
LaBrum.
49. 358 Pa. at 244, 247, 56 A.2d at 248.
50. 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934).
There can be no objection to the preparation of deeds and mort-
gages or other contracts by [defendants] so long as the papers in-
volved pertain to and grow out of their business transactions and
are intimately connected therewith. The drafting and execution of
legal instruments is a necessary concomitant of many businesses
and cannot be considered unlawful. Such practice only falls
within the prohibition of the act when the documents are drawn in
relation to matters in no manner connected with the immediate
business of the person preparing them, and when the person so
drafting them is not a member of the bar and holds himself out as
specially qualified and competent to do that type of work.5'
Although the LaBrum case would, thus, appear to reserve to the
legal profession a realm that reasonably accounts for diverse com-
peting interests without intruding upon the proper business interests
of numerous other enterprises, the inherent limits of the case cannot
be ignored. Pennsylvania has always adhered to the doctrine that
conveyancers and lawyers are engaged in two different professions, a
distinction adopted from English real estate practices. 52 Further-
more, the court did not address generally the concept "unauthorized
practice of law," but predicated its conclusion on a strict interpreta-
tion of a penal statute.53 Nevertheless, the court did emphasize that
the defendant title company was engaged in the "art" of conveyanc-
ing incidental to the insurance of titles,54 which suggests that the re-
sult would not have been different in the absence of statute.55
51. 358 Pa. at 24647, 56 A.2d at 249 (emphasis added).
52. The LaBrum court considered this distinction so fundamental that it concluded that
the legislature, in enacting the unauthorized practice proscriptions, intended to exclude con-
veyancers from the force of the statute.
From the earliest days in this Commonwealth, justices of the peace, aldermen and
local magistrates have drawn and still continue to draw leases, deeds and mortgages
without holding themselves out as lawyers or engaging in the practice of law in the
sense condemned by the statute. . . . All this the legislature must have known...
but notwithstanding such knowledge, it is significant that the legislature gave no ex-
pression of intention to prohibit those practices. We must regard the legislature as
having recognized that in this jurisdiction conveyancers and lawyers have been dealt
with in separate classes. . . . A strict construction of the statute excludes the convey-
ancer, he does not hold himself out as a lawyer engaged in practicing law; he is
engaged in practicing conveyancing.
Id at 244-46, 56 A.2d at 248-49 (citing 2 JOHNSON's ENGLAND 287).
53. Id at 242-46, 56 A.2d at 248-49.
54. Compare id at 244, 56 A.2d at 249, and id at 247, 56 A.2d at 250.
55. Notwithstanding the language of the statute, it is a widely accepted principle that the
legislature cannot constitutionally encroach upon the judiciary's inherent regulatory power
and reserved authority under the separation of powers doctrine to define the bounds of the
practice of law. See, e.g., Land Title Co. of Alabama v. State ex rel. Porter, 292 Ala. 691, 697,
299 So.2d 294, 291 (1974); Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n, 230 Ark. 494, 498, 326
S.W.2d 900, 902 (1959); New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey Mtg. Assocs., 32
N.J. 430, 436-37, 161 A.2d 257, 260, 266 (1960); Grievance Comm. v. Dean, 190 S.W.2d 126,
128-29 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Payne, Title Insurance, the Legislature and the Constitution, 21
ALA. L. REV. 25 (1968); Resh, What Remains of the Practice of Law, 39 UNAUTH. PROC.
NEWS 43, 45 (1974). Comment, Control of the Unauthorized Practice of Law.- Scope of Inherent
JudicialPower, 28 U. CH. L. REV. 162 (1960). Thus, if the court had deemed the defendant's
activities an instance of unauthorized practice it could have properly enjoined defendant from
following those pursuits.
It is worthy of some note, however, that the judiciary's inherent powers were limited in
Arizona by a constitutional amendment promoted by licensed local real estate brokers that was
At the other end of the spectrum are provisions of jurisdictions
such as Kentucky that characterize the practice of law as "any serv-
ice rendered involving legal knowledge or legal advice."56 Liberally
construed, this latter prototype of definition reserves to the legal pro-
fession matters that are not embraced within the policies underlying
the unauthorized practice rule57 and permits a court to catalogue cer-
tain activities that entail some vestige of legal knowledge and then to
ascertain the source of payment, whether immediate or ultimate, to
determine the identity of the perceived client. This mode of analysis
can lead to unpredictable results and makes little allowance for ac-
tivities that constitute a mere incident of doing business. It should
be evident that, whatever the nature of the particular act, it is one
matter to purport to be qualified to practice law and to discourage,
either implicitly or explicitly, the intercession of independent legal
counsel and another matter to furnish services ancillary and
subordinate to the primary pursuit of a legitimate enterprise.
Nevertheless, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Kentucky State
Bar Association v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association58
seized upon the broad language of its own rule of court defining the
practice of law and found that unauthorized practice included a title
examination on the property to be mortgaged performed by a staff
attorney employed on a salary basis by the prospective mortgagee.
Since loans would not be extended unless, in the opinion of an attor-
ney, title was clear and since the mortgagee chose to have its own
attorney examine the various indices, the court concluded that a ben-
carried by a four-to-one margin in a popular vote. ARIz. CONST. Art. 26, § 1. See generally
Riggs, Unauthorized Practice and the Public Interest: Arizona'r Recent Constitutional Amend-
ment, 37 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1964).
56. While the practice of law in Kentucky is defined by court rule, Ky R.C.A. 3.020,
unauthorized practice is prohibited by statute, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.010 (Baldwin 1963).
The pertinent rule of the Court of Appeals provides, rather expansively, "The practice of law is
any service rendered involving legal knowledge or legal advice, whether of representation,
counsel or advocacy in or out of court, rendered in respect to the rights, duties, obligations,
liabilities, or business relations of one requiring the services." An exception is made for natu-
ral persons who draw instruments to which they are a party and for which they receive no
compensation
57. The reasons commonly recited for the prohibition on unauthorized practice are that
the intensive preadmission educational and licensing requirements will insure that all lawyers
will meet at least a minimum standard of competence and that the high professional standards
of ethics will protect the clients' interests. See, e.g., Hamner, supra note 7, at 386-87; John-
stone, supra note 1, at 17; Resh, Safeguarding Administration of Justicefrom Illegal Practice, 42
MARQ L. REV. 484, 487 (1959); Note, UnauthorizedPractice of Law by Realtors and Title Insur-
ance Companies, 49 KY. L.J. 384, 389 (1961). It is difficult to understand how these jusitifica-
tions are served by, for example, denominating the performance of a title search by an attorney
employed by a savings and loan association the performance of legal service for a borrower
simply because a clear title was one of the conditions upon which the loan would be made.
See Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1961).
Even assuming that the employing corporation was not the sole beneficiary of the captive
attorney's services, this would not seem to be an adequate basis for the conclusion that, since a
title examination entails legal knowledge, the corporation furnished legal services to another.
58. 342 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1961).
efit had redounded to the borrower who would not have been eligi-
ble for the loan absent those services.59 A closer analysis would
suggest, however, that the benefit to the borrower was only inciden-
tal. Having determined that a title examination has the characteris-
tics of a legal service and that a charge for the service is passed
through to the borrower, the court found that the case against the
lending institution was complete. No penalty was imposed "since
the violation is not of a flagrant nature."'6
These two cases, LaBrum6' and Kentucky State Bar,62 mark the
termini between which the unauthorized practice controversy waged
by the commercial title insurance industry and the organized bar has
taken form. LaBrum would permit title insurers to perform wide-
ranging ancillary services while the Kentucky State Bar case would
prohibit even the most fundamental activities except the issuance of
a title policy on an independent attorney's certificate.
B. Application of Theory to Practice
L The Indicia of Unauthorized Practice.-Restrictions on the
practice of law address three primary activities-litigation, advice
concerning matters affecting legal relations and the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments. The scope of the practice of law within
the range of these categories is so vaguely defined that, in most in-
stances, the accepted definitions provide little assistance for the reso-
lution of unauthorized practice cases. Statutory provisions usually
state merely that no person shall practice law unless he has been
admitted to the state bar.63 Consequently, the local judiciary has of
necessity developed various tests for determining, in the individual
case, what constitutes the practice of law and which acts, though they
entail a command of legal principles and affect legal rights, should
not be characterized as unauthorized practice." While the practic-
ing bar and the judiciary may be content with the uncertainty that
this case-by-case analysis introduces, some attempt should be made
to reach greater uniformity in application and to establish clearer
lines of demarcation.65
59. Id at 398.
60. Id at 400.
61. See notes 41-55 and accompanying text supra.
62. See notes 56-60 and accompanying text supra.
63. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 30.010 (Baldwin 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1610 (Purdon 1962).
64. One commentator has noted that the appropriate test for unauthorized practice can-
not be whether the documents in question affect the legal status of the parties since the layman
would virtually always be violating the unauthorized practice restriction. Note, Oregon State
Bar v. Gilchrist: The Legality of Unauthorized Practice, 1976 DET. C. L. REV. 293, 306.
65. Morgan, upra note 2, in addressing the purported social benefits of the unauthorized
practice rule questions
[w]hether these theoretical benefits from unauthorized practice rules are ever realized
.... But in any event, the scope of the 'practice of law' which would be necessary to
The tests traditionally invoked by courts assessing the unautho-
rized practice charge can be classified under the following rubrics:
66
(1) the incident-to-business test,
67
(2) the simple-complex test,
6 8
(3) the legal skill test,
69
achieve such benefits would be small indeed compared to the broad and ambiguous
definition currently adopted by the Code. . . . Indeed, not only does this. . . formu-
lation fail to accommodate the public interests involved, but the ambiguity itself cre-
ates a 'chilling effect' on potential competition because of the penalties associated
with overstepping the lines. Because the ambiguity tends to expand the scope of the
lawyers' monopoly, it seems fair to view it as further confirmation of the fact that the
prohibition of unauthorized practice is primarily for the benefit of lawyers.
Id at 711-12; accord, Reeves, UPL: The Lawyers' Monopoly Under Attack, 51 FLA. B.J. 600,
601 (1977). Even more significantly, Jackson, New Developments in Unauthorized Practice
Cases, 57 TITLE NEWS 11 (1978), argues that
decisions in the courts 'on a case-by-case' basis is a thing of the past. Such case-by-
case determination. . . denies due process of law. . . . [Ilt would seem that a defini-
tion of the practice of law constitutionally enforceable contained in a prohibiting
statute would have to be nondiscriminatory, and would have to be sufficiently clear
and precise that it could be understood with reasonable certainty. The mere use of
the words 'practice of law' as a prohibited activity is too vague and would be insuffi-
cient.
Id at 12-13. But see Note, Unauthorized Practice of Law by Real Estate Brokers and Title
Insurance Companies, 36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 374, 387 (1960).
66. This general classification scheme has been cited in several commentaries. See, e.g.,
Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, JR., LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LE-
GAL PROFESSION IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND, 165-68 (1967); Johnstone, supra
note 1, at 15-16; Lancaster, supra note 13, at 45; Payne, Title Insurance and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law Controversy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 423, 445-48 (1969); Note, Unauthorized Prac-
tice ofLaw by Realtors and Title Insurance Companies, 49 Ky. L.J. 384, 385-88 (1961); Note,
Unauthorized Practice by Real Estate Brokers and Title Insurance Companies, 36 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 374, 377-84 (1960).
67. See, e.g., Childs v. Smelzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934):
The drafting and executing of legal instruments is a necessary concomitant of many
businesses and cannot be considered unlawful. Such practice only falls within the
prohibition of the act when the documents are drawn in relation to matters in no
manner connected with the immediate business of the person preparing them ....
Id at 14, 171 A. at 885; accord, Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1954);
Ingham Co. Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955); Hulse v.
Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952). See generally Bar Ass'n of Tennessee, Inc. v.
Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326 S.W.2d 767 (1959):
[Wihile some of the activities of the defendants constitute 'practice of law' or the
doing of 'law business', they are all legitimately incidental to the main or principle
business of defendants, which is title insurance; and, consequently they should not be
adjudged to constitute unlawful practice of law, nor enjoined as such.
Id -, 326 S.W.2d at 781.
68. See State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 91 N.M. 434, 575 P.2d 943 (1978):
We hold that filling in blanks in the legal instruments here involved, where the
forms have been drafted by attorneys and where filling in the blanks requires only
the use of common knowledge regarding the information to be inserted, does not
constitute the practice of law.
Id at 440, 575 P.2d at 949; accord, Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951);
Hulse v. Criger, 363, Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952). But see People v. Title Guar. & Trust
Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 379, 125 N.E. 666, 670 (1919) (Pound, J., concurring) ("I am unable to rest
any satisfactory test on the distinction between simple and complex instruments. The most
complex are simple to the skilled, and the simplest often trouble the inexperienced"). The
simple-complex test is implicit in those decisions permitting nonlawyers to complete standard
form instruments of conveyance. See Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So.2d 818 (Fla.
1954).
69. See Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935):
Practice of law. . . embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large
variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering
an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. . . . [Tihese trans-
(4) the public policy test,70
(5) the compensation test," 7
(6) the traditional-practice test,72 and
(7) the pretense of legal credentials test.73
None of these indicia alone yields a satisfactory standard for con-
duct, and generally courts have acknowledged their complementary
character. The ancillary-to-business and simple-complex tests are
essentially exceptions to the legal skill analysis. Furthermore, it has
been noted that the simple-complex distinction is an implicit limita-
tion on the incident-to-business defense 74 as is the compensation
test.75 Although the public policy mode of analysis is at first appear-
ance most appealing because it permits the fullest consideration of
the competing interests, it still offers no clear guidance and leaves
demarcation of the perimeters of the practice of law to the whims of
the court sitting in post-factum deliberation. Nevertheless, it adds
another dimension to the traditional tests and should be viewed as a
useful adjunct in the unauthorized practice inquiry. Whether the
nonlawyer has been compensated is not particularly revealing since
some element of remuneration, either explicit or implicit, can ulti-
mately be allocated to almost any commercial activity. The most
actions require in many respects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
Id at 613, 194 N.E. at 317; accord, Gustafson v. V.C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 138 Ohio St. 292,
35 N.E.2d 435 (1941).
70. See Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940):
It is the duty of this court so to regulate the practice of law and to restrain such
practice by laymen in a common-sense way in order to protect primarily the interest
of the public and not to hamper and burden such interest with impractical technical
restraints no matter how well supported such restraint may be from the standpoint of
pure logic. Viewing the problem before us in that light, we do not think it would be
m the interest of the public welfare to restrain brokers from drafting the ordinary
instruments necessary to effectuate the closing of the ordinary real estate transaction
in which they are acting.
Id at 647, 290 N.W. at 797; accord, Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952); Bar
Ass'n of Tennessee, Inc. v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326 S.W.2d 767
(1959). See also Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d
998 (1957).
71. Underlying this test is the fundamental rule that the nonlawyer may represent him-
self and that he is forbidden to engage in activities otherwise constituting the practice of law
only when they are performed for another. Therefore, some courts have undertaken the search
for the source of compensation. See Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Ky. 1961) ("If respondent ... is actually rendering a legal service
to members of the public and particularly if it is making a charge for such service, it is engaged
in the unauthorized practice of the law"); accord, New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern New
Jersey Mtg. Assocs. 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960).
72. See text at note 4, supra. See also Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22
A.2d 623 (1941).
73. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1608 (Purdon 1962), construedin LaBrum v. Common-
wealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948). This test is, in effect, a misrepresentation test
and deems the attempt to deceive the public as the essence of the unauthorized practice viola-
tion. The justification is apparent, since by such conduct those seeking legal services are in-
duced to procure the services of a nonlawyer believing he is trained in the law and forego the
assistance of counsel.
74. See Note, Unauthorized Practice by Real Estate Brokers and Title Insurance Compa-
nies, 36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 374, 382 (1961).
75. Id n. 74.
practical analytical structure, taking into account the currently fash-
ionable indicia, would, thus, question first whether legal expertise is
required and then whether the activity is ancillary to a bona fide
business venture and requires only relatively simple and routine
skills. To the extent that these latter questions are answered affirma-
tively, performance of the activity by a nonlawyer should be con-
doned unless evidence can be adduced that it would operate to the
public's detriment. Finally, to state that only lawyers may undertake
the performance of services that are commonly understood as the
practice of law is hopelessly inadequate and would permit the legal
profession to establish its exclusive bounds solely by tradition.
2. The Concept of Title Insurance under Unauthorized Practice
Scrutiny.-The primary function of the title company is to deter-
mine the scope of the risk posed, recommend curative action and
issue a policy of insurance excepting the defects of title that have not
been removed. The evaluation of risk is predicated either on an in-
dependent attorney's certificate of title or upon an abstract prepared
or examination undertaken by the insurer itself.76 In the former in-
stance it is unlikely that a contention of unauthorized practice would
even be ventured. Payne notes, for example,
When a national title insurance company issues a policy
predicated on a certificate furnished by an independent attorney,
the company's officials may exercise some legal judgment.
Generally, the title insurer performs purely ministerial duties in
issuing the policy, thereby providing protection against errors
made by the examining attorney and defects not of record. Purely
national insurers are not engaged in unauthorized practice. To
hold otherwise would be to hold title insurance illegal in to1o, a
result fraught with far ranging and deleterious consequences.77
The tests for unauthorized practice simply do not encompass the in-
surance function.
Payne's concluding remark acknowledges an awareness that ti-
tle insurance serves a vital societal function in the present system of
conveyancing, a conclusion that is acknowledged virtually without
exception.78 Since no examination of title, no matter how thorough
or carefully conducted, can reveal all matters relating to title and
since no opinion of title will offer protection against defects that a
reasonable inspection would not have disclosed, the traditional sys-
tem of title assurance was necessarily incomplete. 79 The evolution of
the title insurance industry, thus, was a response to the inadequacy
76. See notes 21 and 22, supra.
77. Payne, Title Insurance and the Unauthorized Practice of Law Controversy, 53 MINN.
L. REV. 423, 430 (1969). See also id at 436.
78. See, e.g., Oshe, supra note 36, at 248; Note, The Title Insurance Industry and Govern-
mentalRegulation, 53 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1523 (1967).
79. See notes 26 and 27 and accompanying text supra.
of the recording system."0 With the growing discontent over the ex-
tent of assurance, the rapid turnover of real estate occasioned by the
surge in private ownership, the increase in industrial and land devel-
opment, and the rising demand for purchase money financing secur-
ity, the need for a more comprehensive and uniform commitment
guaranteed by corporate assets became apparent."' Title insurance
was also perceived as making property ownership more attractive,
since the insurer generally assumes the burden and expense of de-
fending against adverse claims, and as enhancing marketability by
offering coverage notwithstanding some insignificant defect82 that an
examining attorney, out of an excess of caution, would except from
certification. 3 Though it has been contended that such insurance
thrives upon and perpetuates the inadequacies of the title record sys-
tem, 4 to declare title insurance unlawful in its essence would elimi-
nate a valuable service for which no feasible replacement has yet
been developed. 5
If it is conceded, either on the basis of logic or public policy,
that a title insurer that limits itself to the mere issuance of an insur-
ance policy does not engage in unauthorized practice, then the activ-
ities of a title company that searches title, provides no ancillary
services, but can only be enjoined if the conduct of the title examina-
tion by the company or the proffer of the commitment to insure
based on the examination improperly infringe on the lawyer's do-
80. See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
81. See generally Payne, The Restoration of Conveyancing, 15 ALA. L. REV. 371, 383
(1963). See text at note 37 supra.
82. See Note, The Title Insurance Industry and Governmental Regulation, 53 VA. L. REV.
1523, 1543 (1967).
83. Payne compares the services offered by real estate attorneys and the title insurer in
relation to four elements: (1) cost; (2) speed; (3) adequacy of the examination; and (4) suffi-
ciency of the assurance given. Conceding the extent and reliability of assurance given by the
title company, he makes the following observation:
Unfortunately the land records preserve all defects of title indefinitely and in many
cases the title examiner must determine whether or not such defects may be waived as
creating no substantial current risk. As the individual attorney is not an insurer he
cannot assume some business risks which might be acceptable to a title company and
may, therefore, be compelled to insert exceptions into his opinion which would be
waived by his corporate competitor.
Payne, The Restoration of Conveyancing, 15 ALA. L. REV. 371, 383 (1963). See also
Cooperman v West Coast Title Co., 75 So.2d 818, 821 (Fla. 1954).
84. See note 17 supra.
85. Payne, In Search of Title (pt. 2), 14 ALA. L. REV. 278, 278 (1962), formulates the
threshold inquiry in the unauthorized practice controversy as "who shall be the participants in
the conveyancing process and to what extent?" Four possibilities are presented: (1) the instal-
lation of the Torrens system; (2) the strengthening of the abstract system; (3) the adoption of
universal title insurance; and (4) the return to direct search of the records. He discounts the
first two and concludes that the most reasonable alternatives are corporate title insurance and
reform of the recording system, a process that has yet to see substantial progress. For further
commentary on the viability of the Torrens registration and the abstract systems, see John-
stone, supra note 20, at 513-15; McKillop, supra note 19, at 453-55. Concerning the efficacy of
the Torrens system, see B.C. SHICK & I.H. PLOTKIN, TORRENS IN THE UNITED STATES: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAND-REGISTRATION SYS-
TEMS (1978).
main. On a purely pragmatic plane, attorneys should not be faulted
if they seek to reserve unto themselves perhaps the most remunera-
tive aspect of the real estate practice: certification of title.8 6 It is sig-
nificant to note, however, that title examination has become
essentially a lay activity; the task of collecting the pertinent data is
not uncommonly assigned by lawyers to abstracting companies or to
lower paid nonprofessionals or even to stenographers.8 7
The organized bar is unwilling to surrender the data assembly
function to title companies over which it has no control in part be-
cause such deference disturbs the economic balance of the convey-
ancing practice. Permitting local title companies to issue policies
based on their own examination is objectionable, it is contended.
The objection-not simply a selfish one-is that it excludes the
attorney from the most profitable aspect of title work. Tradition-
ally the price paid for title examination has probably been too
high. At the same time fees for the ancillary services rendered by
attorneys have been too low. But the two balanced out, and the
public obtained adequate service at a reasonable price. This ar-
rangement will be upset if the lawyer loses his fees for title exami-
nation but continues to perform ancillary services, and he would
be forced either to charge larger fees or to abandon this segment
of practice.88
While courts may be sympathetic to the attorney's plight to the ex-
tent that it affects the administration of justice, the economics-of-
practice objection is unlikely to gain popular support.89
A statement of opinion concerning the state of title requires fa-
cility with complex legal principles and presents an entirely different
question. For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Kentucky
State Bar Association v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association9'
held that the lending institution engaged in the unauthorized prac-
tice of law by conditioning the extension of loans on a favorable title
report from its salaried staff attorney. Since the title examination
entailed both an analysis of recorded interests in the land and an
86. See generally Payne, In Search of Tile (pt. 1), 14 ALA. L. REV. 11, 58 (1961); Payne,
(The Restoration of Conveyancing, 15 ALA. L. REV. 371, 371 (1963); Payne, Title Guaranty
Funds: Symptom, Cure or Nostrum?, 46 IND. L.J. 208, 212 (1971).
87. Payne, The Restoration of Conveyancing, 15 ALA. L. REV. 371, 380 (1963). See gener-
ally Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 331, 22 A.2d 623, 626 (1941) (distinguishing
title abstract and title certificate); Florida Bar v. McPhee, 19 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1967). The courts,
however, have with some consistency found that a title examination is an attorney's function.
See Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n, 230 Ark. 494, 326 S.W.2d 900 (1959) (title
examination and curative work, when done for another, constitutes the practice of law in the
strictest sense); accord, Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d
397 (Ky. 1961). But see State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 91 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1
(1961), supplemented, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962).
88. Payne, Title Insurance and the Unauthorized Practice of Law Controversy, 53 MINN.
L. REV. 423, 469 (1969).
89. See Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va.
1977), order vacated pending resolution of state law question, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 436 U.S. 941 (1978).
90. 342 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1961).
opinion of the state of title, the court assumed that it constituted a
legal service. Finding that the borrower was a beneficiary of the ex-
amination and had paid a charge, the court concluded that the serv-
ice was rendered for another in violation of statute.9' Whether the
same analysis can be applied to the title search activities of an in-
surer is questionable, since the primary beneficiary of the report is
the insurer itself, which must evaluate the risk it is insuring. Two
aspects of the Kentucky State Bar case are troublesome, however: the
lending institution was also assessing the value of its security and the
court ventured the cryptic dictum that "[e]ven when a company is
engaged in the title insurance business, it cannot sell to the public,
though [sic] a relatively insignificant part of the transaction, the legal
services of its own salaried attorney."92
The risk evaluation function has, on occasion, been equated
with title certification and is a further aspect of commercial title in-
surance that has been alleged to violate the unauthorized practice
rules. Title companies, upon completion of the record search, pre-
pare a commitment or binder to insure, which enumerates as excep-
tions to coverage various title defects. The insured will either
negotiate for the removal of exceptions, which would generally re-
quire curative measures, or accept the commitment with the stated
exceptions, which would limit the extent of his coverage. The ques-
tion has been raised in this context whether the commitment and the
consequent title policy comprise contracts of insurance93 or prima-
rily opinions of title that only an attorney is authorized to circulate.94
In the most recent case directly confronting this issue, Land Title
Company of 41abama v. State ex rel Porter,95 the court formulated
the pivotal inquiry as whether, regardless of any statutory provision
91. See text at notes 56-60 supra.
92. 342 S.W.2d at 400. The Kentucky court cited the case of Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust
Co. v. State, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d 408 (1958), as authority for the quoted passage, although
the Pioneer Title opinion considered the propriety of a title company's employees passing on
the sufficiency of legal instruments on behalf of real estate purchasers.
93. See Balbach, supra note 13, at 193 n.5, notes "A title insurance company does not
primarily concern itself with the marketability or validity of one's title, but rather with its
insurability." See also Comment, Title Insurance, 13 ALA. L. REV. 381, 384-85 (1961), in
which the writer emphasizes the contractual nature of the insurance and characterizes title
insurance as a contractual undertaking to indemnify against loss. See generally Quiner, supra
note 14, at 714.
94. Payne, Title Insurance and the Unauthorized Practice of Law Controversy, 53 MINN.
L. REV. 423, 439 (1969), in which the author contends that a title policy should not be classified
as a policy of insurance, but should be deemed merely an opinion of title. Id at 438-44.
Payne maintains, "The intention is that [the policy] be relied upon by the assured. Whether
the potential purchaser or mortgagee of land will complete the contemplated transaction de-
pends upon what the policy indicates about the state of the title. Thus, the policy has no other
purpose than to induce action by the person to whom it is issued." Id at 439-40. See also
Lewis, Corporate Capacity to Practice Law - A Study in Legal Hocus Pocus, 2 MD. L. REv. 348-
49 (1938); Payne, Title Guaranty Fund- Symptom, Cure or Nostrum?, 46 IND. L.J. 208, 217-18
(1970).
95. 292 Ala. 691, 299 So.2d 289 (1974).
authorizing the title insurer's conduct, the title company by issuing
commitments for insurance engaged in the practice of law. By fram-
ing the question in this fashion, the court acknowledged its inherent
power9 6 to supervise the practice of law. Noting that "a title insur-
ance company must be allowed to review public records and specify
any curative work to be done before it will issue a policy," Justice
Harwood determined that the ensueing commitment "merely speci-
fies the estate to be covered in a title policy to be later issued, and
specifies the owner of the property as of the date of Commit-
ment. . . . This falls far short of a title opinion."97 In essence, if a
company is entitled to engage in the business of title insurance, it
may also examine the registries for documents relating to title and
assess its risk.
The underlying rationale, articulated most concisely in the Flor-
ida case of Cooperman v. West Coast Title Company,9" is evident
from the nature of the risk-evaluation function:
[Iln the search for intelligence upon which must depend the deci-
sion either to issue or decline a commitment, the corporations can-
not be said to be engaging in the practice of law, for to practice
law one must have a client and in such instances their clients are
themselves.
99
Upon considering the title company's procedure in a typical transac-
tion, the Florida court determined that the entire effort of the insurer
is to determine the risk for which the policy would provide indem-
nification, a function different from an attorney's certification of
merchantability. Because the company's sole remuneration con-
sisted of the premium, which could only be earned upon an in-
surable transfer, it had a sufficient interest in consummating the
conveyance to justify its supervision. Even after commitment, the
court concluded, the insurer was still representing itself and, thus, its
conduct could not constitute the practice of law." °
Certain limitations on this doctrine have been defined. First, if
a charge is imposed for the service of examining title the examiner
might be deemed to have done the work for another and, therefore,
96. See note 55 supra.
97. 292 Ala. at 698-99, 299 So.2d at 295; accord, Wollitzer v. National Title Guar. Co.,
148 Misc. 529, 533, 266 N.Y.S. 184, 189 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'dmem., 241 App. Div. 757, 270
N.Y.S. 968 (1934).
98. 75 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1954). The Cooperman court held that, to the extent that its acts
are indispensable to the determination of insurability and no additional charge is imposed, a
title insurer may examine public records to ascertain state of title and may evaluate the data to
determine whether to issue a commitment for insurance.
99. Id at 820. See aLro People v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 191 App. Div. 165, 181 N.Y.S.
52, afftdmem., 230 N.Y. 578, 130 N.E. 901 (1920) (Kelly, J. dissenting) (searching and insuring
titles "is important work, and in itself very profitable. It involves knowledge of the law, but
that legal knowledge is a matter between the corporation and its employes").
100. Id at 821; accord, Florida Bar v. McPhee, 195 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1967). See also Bar
Ass'n of Tennessee, Inc. v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, -, 326 S.W.2d
767, 780-81 (1959) (quoting from opinion of Chancery Court).
to have violated the unauthorized practice prohibition.' 0 Second,
the charge for abstracting may not exceed the actual cost to the in-
surer of performing the services.' 02 Although compensation is not
determinative, courts have considered it indicative and useful in dis-
counting the self-representation defense.'03 Third, the results of the
search may not be furnished to the purchaser except in conjunction
with, and as part of, the guarantee of title."w Last, by necessary in-
ference, if no bona fide application for insurance is pending it would
be beyond the authority of the title company to prepare abstracts
and certificates of title for sale.' 05 Subject to these conditions, the
principal functions of the title company, examination of title and is-
suance of the commitment to insure, would seem not to violate the
unauthorized practice prohibition.
3. Ancillary Services of Title Insurers.-Unlike the relatively
consistent results when the activities of corporate insurers before the
time of commitment have been challenged, no consensus has
emerged concerning the propriety of such ancillary activities as the
completion of form instruments, curative measures, supervision of
the real estate closing and escrow services. Courts have differed
about the applicable tests, and although the result is not always pre-
dictable and the reasoning often inadequate, their conclusions have
yielded specific examples of unauthorized conduct that offer some
guidance within the particular jurisdictions. The result generally de-
101. See Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n, 230 Ark. 494, 326 S.W.2d 900 (1959).
102. New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey Mtg. Assocs., 32 N.J. 430, 443,
161 A.2d 257 (1960) (citing Title Guaranty Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 312 P.2d
1011 (1957); Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946
(1944)). On certified appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court defined "cost" to include a "rea-
sonable allocation of the direct and overhead expenses" incurred incident to reading the ab-
stract. 34 N.J. 301, 169 A.2d 150, 152 (1961), notedin Comment, UnauthorizedPractice of Law
by Title Companies, 7 N.Y.L.F. 191 (1961).
103. See Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 397 (Ky.
1961). See also Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n, 230 Ark. 494, 326 S W.2d 900
(1959). In both Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1954), and LaBrum v.
Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948), the court in refusing to find justifi-
cation for the unauthorized practice charges noted the absence of a charge for the allegedly
unlawful activity. See generally Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex.
506, 516-17, 179 S.W.2d 946, 952 (1944), in which the court held that a "loss leader" consti-
tuted "a part of the total service for which the customers pay. There is therefore 'a considera-
tion, reward, of pecuniary benefit' flowing to the defendant for the legal services so rendered."
104. Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 32-33 193 N.E. 650,
654 (1934). In a subsequent case, it was charged that the title company acted improperly in
contracting to perform various "title services," including examining title, recommending cura-
tive measures, preparing title reports and keeping records for the State Turnpike Commission,
even though a policy of insurance might never be issued. Following the rule articulated in
Dworken, the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio, entered judgment against
the insurer for "the bartering, for a price, of legal opinions on title on the market." Steer v.
Land Title Guar. & Trust Co., 113 N.E.2d 763, 767 (Ohio C.P. 1953). See generaly Florida
Bar v. Columbia Title, 197 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1967), adopting the referee's report that no insurance
was applied for in the subject transaction in which the company rendered title services.
105. See generally Steer v. Land Title Guar. & Trust Co., 113 N.E.2d 763 (Ohio C.P.
1953).
pends on whether the court recognizes the defenses that the services
are incidental to underwriting the title risk and do not entail a mas-
tery of complex principles of law or perceives some justifying public
benefit. Consequently, in some jurisdictions title companies may
complete simple form documents of conveyance, though courts have
limited such practices to instances in which the company has not
exercised discretion in choosing the appropriate form"° and has not
imposed a separate charge, °7 while in other jurisdictions drafting
and filling out blanks in instruments of conveyance are strictly an
attorney's function that laymen are precluded from undertaking un-
less they are parties to the transaction.0 8 Title companies are com-
monly permitted to provide escrow services"° and to recommend
that curative documents be executed," 10 but are often denied further
106. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. McPhee, 195 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1967); State Bar v. Guardian
Abstract & Title Co., Inc., 91 N.M. 434, 575 P.2d 943 (1978); Bar Ass'n of Tennessee, Inc. v.
Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326 S.W.2d 767 (1959); cf. Pioneer Title
Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d 767 (1958) (court did not object to clerical
preparation of form instruments, but found that examination constituted rendering of legal
opinion by corporation). See also Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952) (real
estate broker may, in transactions in which he is acting as broker, use standardized form of
deeds, notes, mortgages and leases prepared or approved by counsel and may complete them
by filling in blank spaces to show the parties, descriptions and term). But see Washington
State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash.2d 697, 701, 251 P.2d 619, 621
(1952) ("The fact that the form of deed he used may have been proper or approved by statute
or counsel, is not a justification for defendant's action").
107. See, e.g., State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., Inc., 91 N.M. 434, 575 P.2d 943
(1978); cf., Creekmore v. Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 367 S.W.2d 419 (1963) (real estate broker, when
the person for whom he is acting has declined to employ a lawyer to prepare the necessary
documents and has authorized the broker to do so, may fill in blanks on simple standardized
real estate forms previously approved by a lawyer when no charge has been imposed for the
service and the transaction arose in the usual course of broker's business). Ingham Co. Bar
Ass'n v Walter Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955) (realtors do not engage in
practice of law by completing and filling out printed forms of deeds, land contracts, leases and
notices determining tenancy incident to consummating transactions in which they act as bro-
kers when no compensation is exacted); Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952)
(real estate broker may not make separate charges for completing any standardized forms, and
he may not prepare forms in transactions in which he is not a broker).
108. See, e.g., Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n, 230 Ark. 494, 326 S.W.2d 900
(1959); Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 312 P.2d 1011 (1957); Boykin v.
Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S.E. 796 (1932); New Jersey Bar Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey Mtg.
Assocs., 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960); Guardian Abstract & Title Co. v. San Antonio Bar
Ass'n, 278 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), rev'don other grounds, 156 Tex. 7, 291 S.W.2d
697 (1956); Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance Comm., 272 S.W.2d 948 (rex. Civ. App. 1954);
Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944); Stew-
art Abstract Co. v. Judicial Comm. of Jefferson Co., 131 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
See also People v. Lawyers Title Corp., 282 N.Y. 513, 27 N.E.2d 30 (1940). See generaly
Comment, Unauthorized Practice of Law by Title Companies, 7 N.Y.L.F. 191 (1961).
109. See, e.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961),
supplemented, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962); Florida Bar v. McPhee, 195 So.2d 552 (Fla.
1967); Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1954); Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust
Co. v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d 408 (1958); Bar Ass'n of Tennessee, Inc. v. Union
Planters Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326 S.W.2d 767 (1959). But see Title Guar. Co. v.
Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo 423, 429-30, 312 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (1957).
110. See, e.g., Land Title Co. v. State ex rel. Porter, 292 Ala. 691, 299 So.2d 289 (1974);
Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1954); Land Title Abstract & Trust Co.
v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934); LaBrum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358
Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948); Bar Ass'n of Tennessee, Inc. v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 46
participation in the consummation of the transfer."'
Since many of these services are conceptually simple or
mechanical and the purchaser has a recognizable interest in reducing
the expense of conveyance, the trend of more recent opinion seems
to be that attorneys' services are costly, or even extraneous, and
should not be imposed on the homebuyer. Expressing this current
public sentiment, President Carter recently remarked,
In a great number of cases there is no sound reason for a lawyer to
be involved in land transfers or title searches. Simplified proce-
dures and use of modem computer technology can save consum-
ers needless fees.12
One recent study of home transfer costs similarly emphasized the
inefficiency that results from requiring attorney representation in the
less complex aspects of the real estate conveyance.' 13 Nevertheless,
each party should be encouraged to secure independent legal counsel
and it is the function of the organized bar to educate the public
about the legitimacy of the attorney's role in the real estate settle-
ment. "4 Alternative sources of assistance should not be foreclosed,
however, when the purchasers might reasonably prefer the less ex-
pensive to the most sophisticated service. 115
IV. In Search of Public Policy: Guardian Abstract and Surety
Title
As the two recent cases of State Bar of New Mexico v. Guardian
Abstract & Title Co. " 6 and Surety Title Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Vir-
Tenn. App. 100, 326 S.W.2d 767 (1959); Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142
Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944). But see Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n, 230 Ark.
494, 326 S.W.2d 900 (1959) (title examination and curative work, when done for another, con-
stitute the practice of law).
111. See, e.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961),
supplemenled, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962); Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar,
74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d 408 (1958); New Jersey Bar Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey Mtg. Assocs.,
32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960); Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex.
506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944).
112. Address by President Carter, Remarks of the President at the 100th Anniversary
Lunch of the Los Angeles Bar Association, in Los Angeles (May 4, 1978).
113. Whitman, Home Transfer Costs.An Economic and LegalAnaysis, 62 GEO. L.J. 1311
(1974):
A major factor in the inefficiency of present real estate transfers is the concept that
attorneys should search titles and conduct closings. The use of legally trained profes-
sionals to perform these routine tasks constitutes an enormous waste of skill and
causes increased overall costs to parties. . . . The more reasonable system would be
one in which laymen conducted the mechanical work of title transfers, but under
which each party could determine his own need for legal representation.
Id at 1334. See also Creekmore v Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 367 S.W.2d 419 (1963); State Bar v.
Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 91 N.M. 434, 575 P.2d 943 (1978).
114. EC 3-7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explains that the duty to help the
public recognize legal problems is intended to aid nonlawyers "understand why it may be
unwise for them to act for themselves in matters having legal consequences." See note 3 supra.
115. See generally Morgan, supra note 2, at 708-09.
116. 91 N.M. 434, 575 P.2d 943 (1978).
ginia State Bar' 17 suggest, the force of these arguments has not been
lost on the judiciary. The precise impact of these two decisions is
difficult to assess, although it is safe to conclude that the courts in
unauthorized practice cases will examine more closely the extent to
which the policies underlying the prohibition would be promoted by
granting the relief requested."i8 Presumably the contention will be
raised that the Guardian Abstract case is distinguishable in unautho-
rized practice controversies arising in jurisdictions other than the fo-
rum state because of the singular nature of the statutorily approved
forms."I9 The immediate import of the New Mexico case was that
title insurers who merely fill in the blanks of attorney-drafted, stan-
dard legal forms required in real estate sales or loans in instances
when an application for insurance had been submitted, do not en-
gage in the unauthorized practice of law.'2° If substantial legal
rights are affected and protection of those rights requires legal skill
and knowledge that the average citizen could not be deemed to pos-
sess, then the particular practice must be limited to the legal profes-
sion.' 2 ' Unlike its predecessors, however, the New Mexico court was
not content with merely reciting the incidental and the simple-com-
plex criteria, but contrasted the policy underlying the unauthorized
practice restriction with the practical effect of the restraint.'22
In accordance with the current jurisprudence, 23 the court de-
clined to render a comprehensive definition of the "practice of law"
and adopted an ad hoc approach instead. Rather than undertake the
"onerous task" of formulating such a definition, the court limited the
exclusive "practice" to those instances in which "doubtful legal ques-
117. 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977), order vacated pending resolution ofstale law ques-
tion, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 941 (1978).
118. Although earlier cases had also employed a public policy analysis, see note 70 supra,
they seemed to suggest that the defendant's conduct would not be condemned if the lay activi-
ties served the public interest or convenience. See Creekmore v. Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 367
S.W.2d 419 (1963); Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.
2d 998 (1957); Ingham Co. Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713
(1955); Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642,290 N.W. 795 (1950); Bar Ass'n of Tennessee, Inc. v.
Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326 S.W.2d 767 (1959). Guardian Abstract,
in contrast, appears to impose the obligation to establish public injury on the prosecuting
party. See 91 N.M. at 440, 575 P.2d at 949. In the same vein, the lower court in Surety Title,
an antitrust action, refused to find the state action immunity applicable to the Virginia State
Bar because the unauthorized practice opinion process was not proved sufficiently to promote
the underlying policy and had not been ordered by the state courts or legislature. 431 F. Supp
at 308.
119. See State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961),
supplemented, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962), where the court discounted the applicability
of State ex rel Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis.2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961), because of the
Wisconsin legislature's approval of various standard real estate forms.
120. 91 N.M. at 440, 575 P.2d at 949.
121. Id
122. Id See note 118 supra.
123. See, e.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 87, 366 P.2d 1, 8-9
(1961), supplemented, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962); State ex rel Norvell v. Credit Bureau
of Albuquerque, 85 N.M. 521, 526, 514 P.2d 40, 45 (1973).
tions are involved, which, to safeguard the public, reasonably de-
mand the application of a trained legal mind."' 4 It then determined
that the test must be applied in a manner that would protect prima-
rily the public interest. In applying the test that it had propounded,
the court noted the long acquiescence of the bar in the title compa-
nies' activities and concluded,
There was no convincing evidence that the massive changeover in
the performance of the service from attorneys to the title compa-
nies during the past several years has been accompanied by any
great loss, detriment or inconvenience to the public. The uncon-
troverted evidence was that using lawyers for this simple opera-
tion considerably slowed the loan closings and cost the persons
involved a great deal more money ...
It seems eminently clear that it would be a burden on the
public for us to now decree that such acts constitute the unautho-
rized practice of law. We would be asserting impractical and tech-
nical restrictions that have no reasonable justification.' 25
Because the sixteen-year interim during which the title insurers had
engaged in the challenged activities had inflicted no demonstrable
harm on the public,'26 the court reasoned that now to require the
assistance of attorneys would only complicate the transaction and
would be impractical, technical and unreasonable.
Though the court permitted title insurers to complete forms for
real estate closings, it imposed four restrictions. First, the insurer
may not exercise legal judgment concerning which form would be
appropriate. Second, separate charges may not be imposed for com-
pleting forms since this would emphasize conveyancing and legal
drafting. Third, a layman may not represent to have legal expertise
in the field of conveyancing. Last, employees of title companies who
obtain information from parties for purposes of offering legal advice
are engaging in the practice of law. The express result of the Guard-
ian Abstract case is, therefore, that compelling attorney representa-
tion in the routine completion of standard forms cannot be grounded
in public policy, but that the public's interest might best be served by
permitting title companies to perform such services incident to their
insurance function. The attorney, however, still plays an essential
role when legal expertise is required.
The Surety Title'27 case, although conceptually related to
Guardian Abstract, was not a traditional unauthorized practice pros-
ecution, but an antitrust action instituted by the title company, a rare
124. 91 N.M. at 439, 575 P.2d at 948.
125. Id at 440, 575 P.2d at 949.
126. The court carefully noted, however, that the prolonged abstention of legal practition-
ers created no prescriptive rights, but was a factor in the appraisal of whether the public had
been injured.
127. Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977),
order vacaledpending resolution of slate law question, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 941 (1978).
reversal of roles. ' 28 Nevertheless, the analysis employed is instruc-
tive in the wake of the New Mexico case. At issue was the process by
which the state bar issued advisory opinions relating to ethics and
the unauthorized practice of law, 129 which, in conjunction with the
threat of disciplinary proceedings against attorneys who disobeyed
the stated principles, resulted in a boycott of the title company's
services.130 The various opinions, in combination, required interven-
tion of an attorney at some stage of the insurance commitment pro-
cedure and, thus, precluded the possibility that a title company could
issue a policy directly to a purchaser upon his application.'13' While
the opinions did not purport to regulate directly the conduct of the
insurer, they had a decided chilling effect on attorneys who were em-
ployed by or affiliated with the title insurer. 132 Since in Virginia the
preparation of deeds constitutes the practice of law, 133 plaintiff, who
sought otherwise to eliminate the services of an attorney from the
128. Subsequent to institution of the antitrust action, the Attorney General of Virginia
filed a complaint against plaintiff with the Circuit Court of Virginia Beach charging the unau-
thorized practice of law. 431 F Supp. at 300 n.2.
129. The district court emphasized,
Plaintiff does not challenge either the definition of the practicce of law as enunciated
by the Supreme Court of Virginia nor the correctness of any particular ethical or
unauthorized practice of law opinion. Rather, it is the method by which these opin-
ions are issued that is alleged to be in violation of the federal antitrust laws.
431 F. Supp. at 300. By attacking the process itself, plaintiff attempted to avoid raising a state
law question and the doctrine of abstention.
130. Four Unauthorized Practice of Law Opinions were directly pertinent to the case.
Opinion No. 17 recommended that the definition of practice of law not be amended to permit
title companies to certify titles. Opinion No. 43 states that a title company that issues a title
insurance policy based upon a title examination performed by a nonlawyer is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. Opinion No. 44 permits the company, upon an attorney's re-
quest, to search title and furnish title information to the attorney and to issue the commitment
to whomever the attorney designates. Opinion No. 46 endorses the forwarding of title search
results directly to customers who have staffcounsel. Furthermore, under the Virginia Supreme
Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Jones & Robins, 186 Va. 30, 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947), only
an attorney may prepare deeds. The effect is to interpose the presence of counsel in every title
insurance transaction that contemplates transfer of title. Because plaintiff sought to issue com-
mitments directly to the consumer, the inevitable result of this regulatory scheme was a boy-
cott.
131. The title company sought to eliminate the attorney and, concomitantly, his fee from
the insurance transaction. 431 F. Supp. at 302, 303. The court found that plaintiff's business
approach would result in the consumer receiving greater services than presently offered at a
substantially lower cost. Id at 303.
132. The court noted,
The defendant's opinions. . . raise the powerful specter of disciplinary action to any
attorney who participates in a real estate transaction wherein the title insurance is
obtained without the services of a lawyer. . . . The net effect, predictably, is that
attorneys, who are essential to the plaintiffs business, refuse to prepare deeds in
transactions where the plaintiff provides the title insurance under its proposed
method of doing business. Indeed only ten of the approximately two hundred to
three hundred attorneys contacted by the plaintiff expressed any interest in perform-
ing services for it.
Id at 303.
133. Commonwealth v. Jones & Robins, 186 Va. 30, 44, 41 S.E.2d 720, 727 (1947) (prepa-
ration of deeds, deeds of trust, mortgages and deeds of release by real estate brokers constitutes
the illegal practice of law); accord, Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F.
Supp. 298, 303 (E.D. Va. 1977).
insurance transaction, was constrained to conform to the dictates of
the unauthorized practice opinions.
Fatal to the opinion format was the circumstance that only at-
torneys, who necessarily had a direct pecuniary interest 134 in an ex-
pansive definition of unauthorized practice, could invoke the
mechanism. 35 No provision was made for judicial review of the
opinions, and the layman, who had the greatest need for clarification
of the bounds of unauthorized practice, had no access to the defini-
tional process. 136  Recognizing that legitimate policies were served
by restricting the practice of law to those licensed by the state, the
court concluded,
There is nothing in the instant record, moreover, that indi-
cates that either the legislature or the Supreme Court of Virginia
intended to restrain competition between lawyers and laymen in
areas which arguably do not lie within the definition of the prac-
tice of law. The state policy behind restricting the practice of law
to licensed attorneys is to protect the public and not . . . to
financially benefit a particular segment of society. That intent is
thwarted when, as here, the regulatory activity serves an anticom-
petitive end without necessarily improving the services rendered
to the consuming public.'
37
In summary, not only is the Unauthorized Practice of Law
opinion process tenuously related to the state interest it purports
to advance, but it operates in a decidedly anticompetitive fashion
offensive to notions of basic fairness. It does not act to advance
the consumer interest, but merely that of the attorney. 38
134. Judge Merhige, at various points in his opinion, cited the economic interest of the
organized bar in reserving to its members the more lucrative aspects of the real estate practice.
Alluding momentarily to the purpose of the opinion process, he offered the rather cynical
statement,
The Court, at this juncture, is not in a position to reach any conclusion with regard to
the intent of the defendant. There are sufficient indications in the record, however, to
question whether the UPL opinions concerning title insurance were based entirely on
considerations of public interest.
Id at 304 n.7. See also id at 308.
135. The irony of the process did not escape the court, which presumed that the justifica-
tion for the practice restraint was to advance the interests of the consuming public.
The advisory opinion process . . . cannot reasonably be said to deter those from
whom the public may need protection as only licensed attorneys may obtain these
opinions. The layman contemplating conduct which might consitute the practice of
law, and hence from whom the public needs protection, has no access to the defend-
ant's advisory opinion process. Thus, it would appear that the persons who the State
desires to deter and who have the greatest need for advisory opinions are excluded
from the process presently under attack. . . . Attorneys as a class. . . should be the
last segment of society in need of advisory opinions pertaining to the Virginia
Supreme court's definition of the practice of law.
Id at 308.
136. The Virginia Supreme Court Rules, Rule 6:IV, § 10, 216 Va. 1147 (1976), quoted in
Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298, 301 (E.D. Va. 1977),
authorizes any active member of the bar to solicit advisory opinions on matters concerning the
professional conduct of the attorney. This prompted the court to epitomize the unauthorized
practice opinion process as follows: "In short, advisory opinions are issued by lawyers in re-
sponse to questions submitted by lawyers and no provision is made to inject the participation
of non-interested parties into the process." Id at 301. See also note 135 supra.
137. Id at 307, 308.
138. Id at 308-09.
Having found that the anticompetitive effects of the bar's issuance of
these opinions outweighed the public interest in preventing
uauthorized practice, the court refused to acknowledge the state ac-
tion immunity exemption 39 and granted plaintifis motion for sum-
mary judgment. The bar association was enjoined from issuing
further opinions defining unauthorized practice and was advised to
expunge from its records all related prior opinions. 14°
Once again, the limitations of the decision must be noted. The
court did not have the benefit of the United States Supreme Court's
pronouncements in Bates v. State Bar ofArizona 14' about the availa-
bility of state action immunity to professional organizations and
should not, after deciding that the opinion process was state-com-
pelled, have engaged in the further analysis whether the process
served a legitimate state interest. 42 Moreover, the respective roles of
the Virginia Supreme Court and the Virginia State Bar in the adop-
tion and enforcement of advisory opinions and the scope of the State
Bar's authority had not yet been clearly articulated as a matter of
state law. 143  Finally, the court explicitly refused to deliberate the
merits of any unauthorized practice opinion 44 and confined its com-
mentary strictly to the immunity issue. It decided only that the proc-
ess did not sufficiently promote the intended objectives because the
persons most in need of advice were excluded. Nevertheless, the
court's willingness to distinguish between the public welfare and the
good of the legal profession and the court's reluctance to permit at-
torneys to dictate the bounds of their own monopoly 45 suggest the
139. Id at 309.
140. The order entered by the district court is set forth in a footnote to the opinion of the
circuit court on appeal. Virginia State Bar v. Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 571 F.2d at 205,
206 n.4 (4th Cir. 1978) (vacating district court's order and remanding the case to withhold
further action until the unauthorized practice charge against plaintiff, Surety Title, has been
prosecuted to completion).
141. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
142. The Bates analysis of the state action immunity would question only whether the
action was state-compelled and supervised, but would not engage in the secondary inquiry into
the relationship between the anticompetitive activity and the state interest it purports to ad-
vance. See 433 U.S. at 359-60. See generally 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1061 (1978), in which the
commentator concludes that the court in Surety Title reached the correct result for the wrong
reason and should have addressed the state bar's limited agency status.
143. The circuit court remanded for the sole purpose of obtaining a clarification whether
the opinion process was state-compelled. By so ruling, the appellate court ignored the district
court's finding of compulsion. Since resolution of this question depended on the state court's
final disposition of the unauthorized practice prosecution against the title company, the doc-
trine of abstention was deemed applicable. Virginia State Bar v. Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc.,
571 F.2d 205, 207-08 (4th Cir. 1978).
See Cicalese & Cicalese, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Surety Title Insurance Agency,
Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 83 COM. L.J. 575, 578 (1978), for a discussion of the options now
available to the Virginia state courts as a result of the two federal court opinions.
144. 431 F. Supp. at 300, 308 n.17.
145. One notable, and recent, example of the efforts of the organized bar to preclude com-
petition in the property transfer business was the adoption by the Allen County Indiana Bar
Association of a resolution amending the Standards of Marketability of Abstracts of Title,
which advise attorneys that a title insurance policy is acceptable only if an abstract of title is
advent of a more rational approach to the unauthorized practice
doctrine.
V. Conclusions
Whether title companies will continue to play an important role
in the conveyancing process or will decline as the inadequacies of the
contemporary system of real estate recordation are remedied re-
mains to be seen. While it is evident that the legal profession cannot
eliminate a legitimate competitor for title services merely by either
broadening or obscuring the definition of the practice of law, both
bench and bar are disinclined to undertake the "onerous" task of
formulating a definition of unauthorized practice that could be ap-
plied uniformly to eliminate much of the uncertainty along the pe-
riphery of the practice of law. Most appropriately, a comprehensive
definition of the practice of law would be derived legislatively, since
it is inevitably a matter in which the public interest must be consid-
furnished the purchaser or a title policy had previously been issued on the same tract before a
prescribed date. The resolution of May 17, 1978 adds the following proviso:
Provided, however, that if title insurance is provided, then said title insurance
shall only be acceptable if it is issued based upon a written opinion by an attorney
licensed to practice in the State of Indiana which opinion is based on an examination
of a current Abstract of Title, which current Abstract shall be furnished to the buyer
and thereafter shall be the property of the buyer.
The purpose of the Bar Association's resolution is evident: to interject the presence of an attor-
ney into every title insurance transaction unless the parties to the conveyance have specifically
agreed otherwise.
The Allen County situation also evidences domination by an interested minority: only
twenty-five of the Bar Association's four hundred members attended the meeting at which the
resolution was proposed. Furthermore, of the fifteen members of the Abstract of Title Com-
mittee, which introduced the resolution, twelve were either directly or indirectly associated as
counsel for lending institutions. The Journal-Gazette (For Wayne), June 16, 1978, at I C. As
a consequence of the Bar Association's resolution, some commercial banks and savings and
loan companies have apparently refused to accept title insurance absent lawyer approval and
numerous realtors are hesitant to engage in real estate transactions without assuming the addi-
tional cost of an abstract and examination by an attorney. On February 21, 1979, the contro-
versial rule was deleted by the Board of Directors of the Bar Association because of the public
reaction and in an effort to abort the investigation by the United States Department of Justice
into potential antitrust violations. The events occurring between the date of adoption and the
date of deletion are chronicled in The Journal-Gazette (Fort Wayne), Sept. 9, 1978 and The
Journal-Gazette (Fort Wayne), March 1, 1979, at I C.
Notwithstanding the withdrawal of this proviso, the Department of Justice filed its Com-
plaint on March 2, 1979 against the Allen County Indiana Bar Association, Inc., alleging viola-
tions of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976), and seeking injunctive
relief. The Complaint charges that defendants have committed the following wrongful acts:
(a) Adopted, promoted and disseminated a resolution and a Statement of Principles
intended to limit and restrict the sale of title insurance in lieu of abstract exami-
nation;
(b) Induced lending institutions not to lend money for the purchase of residential
real estate except after examination by an attorney of an abstract of title;
(c) Discouraged the public, real estate brokers and other attorneys from participat-
ing in residential real estate transactions without the examination by an attorney
of an abstract of title.
Complaint at 5, United States v. Allen County Indiana Bar Association, Inc., No. F-79-0042
(N.D. Ind., filed March 2, 1979). The Complaint further contends that the actions of the Bar
Association have resulted in the maintenance of the cost of title certification at "artifically high
levels" and the denial to consumers of the benefits of free and open competition. Id at 6.
ered by a body not exclusively constituted of lawyers. Nevertheless,
courts have the undoubted power to define and regulate the practice
of law, and statutory provisions have been tolerated primarily out of
comity or as an expression of public policy. Legislative efforts, thus,
have remained mere guidelines. The judicial supremacy doctrine,
however, has its limitations and would seem to apply in the unautho-
rized practice context only to matters directly related to the adminis-
tration of justice in instances in which a mastery of complex legal
principles is essential.
In the absence of clearly articulated guidelines, each jurisdiction
has developed its own standards and indicia in response to individ-
ual instances of alleged unauthorized conduct, and the extent of the
lawyer's monopoly varies correspondingly. The courts all agree on
at least one point, however: restricting the practice of law to persons
learned in the law, subject to professional ethical precepts and under
judicial supervision serves a vital societal purpose. But, if enforce-
ment of the prohibitions against unauthorized practice is to have any
justification in public policy, the definition of the exclusive realm of
practice must begin with the interests that the restraint is intended to
serve. Accordingly, lay competition in matters intimately associated
with a legitimate business venture should be proscribed only when
evidence of a nonspeculative threat to the public welfare can be ad-
duced and no offsetting social benefit can be demonstrated. The ap-
propriate test, as articulated by the Supreme Court of New Mexico,
must be whether the challenged activity entails a comprehension of
legal principles that transcends the understanding of "a reasonably
intelligent layman who is reasonably familiar with similar trans-
actions. The test must be applied in a commonsense way which will
protect primarily the interest of the public. . . .,,,4
146. State Bar v Guardian Abstract & Title Co., Inc., 91 N.M. 434, 439, 575 P.2d 943, 948
(1978) (emphasis added).
